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CRITICAL CHALLENGES
• Federal housing assistance only serves about one of every four eligible households, and an estimated
12.4 million low-income renters face serious housing problems without any assistance.
– The primary problem these unassisted households face is affordability, with rents rising faster than
incomes for low-wage workers.
• A disproportionate share of the subsidized stock is concentrated in distressed neighborhoods, where
jobs are scarce, schools perform poorly, and crime and violence are common.
• Neither federal policy nor local practice is taking full advantage of opportunities to link housing assistance
with services to improve outcomes for children or encourage family economic success.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT
At the federal level
• Help raise the visibility of rental housing issues on the national policy agenda and encourage debate
about the federal role and scale of assistance.
• Support legislation that builds on lessons from HOPE VI, targeting resources to replace distressed and
overly concentrated public housing with mixed-income developments, while preserving affordable options
for low-income households and protecting the hard to house.
• Ensure that any expansion of the Moving to Work initiative that allows further experimentation with
housing subsidy formulas and occupancy rules requires rigorous evaluation to assess the impacts on
family well-being and economic success.
• Explore opportunities to expand funding for programs that link housing assistance with support services
both for families’ economic success and children’s well-being.
At the state and local levels
• Encourage regulatory reforms that permit and encourage more affordable rental housing construction 
in opportunity-rich communities.
• Support state and local initiatives that make low-wage workers better able to afford housing, including
minimum wage laws and supplemental earned income tax credits.
• Support the expansion of state and local funding for affordable housing preservation and production,
including creation of housing trust funds.
• Support innovative local strategies for deconcentrating public and assisted housing, including both 
project-based and tenant-based strategies.
• Help build rigorous monitoring and evaluation into any local experimentation with assisted housing 
subsidy formulas or occupancy rules.
• Encourage local adoption of best practices for support services that can be linked to assisted housing.
At the neighborhood level
• Help improve and expand services for residents of particular projects, including work readiness, 
job training, and job retention services.
• Support mobility counseling and housing search assistance to enable voucher recipients to move to
safe, opportunity-rich neighborhoods.
• Support the development and operation of high-quality supportive housing for the most vulnerable 
residents of public and assisted housing.
• Participate in the design and implementation of local public housing demolition and redevelopment 
projects so they enhance the well-being of current and future residents.
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MONTHLY RENT OR MORTGAGE PAY-
ments constitute the single biggest expenditure in
most family budgets, and many low-income families
have difficulty finding housing they can reasonably
afford. Although most family-strengthening and
community change initiatives recognize the urgency
of the housing problems facing low-income families,
they often have difficulty figuring out how to con-
structively address them. Federal housing programs
are numerous and confusing, implementation is balka-
nized, funding falls woefully short of needs, and pol-
icy debates often focus on narrow technical issues. This
primer intends to demystify federal rental assistance
programs and provide the most current information
available on how many (and who) they serve and how
their scale is changing over time.1 It also summarizes
key challenges facing housing policy today and in the
coming years—challenges that may create opportu-
nities for federal, state, and local engagement and
innovation.
Understanding the Basics
The federal government began building subsidized
housing during the New Deal, and in the decades
since, a complex tangle of federal programs has
evolved to tackle the housing needs of low-income
renters. Today, federal housing programs fall into three
basic categories: (1) programs that provide deep, gap-
filling rent subsidies, earmarked either for particular
buildings or for individual households; (2) tax credits
that produce new housing with moderate (below-
market) rent levels; and (3) block grants that provide
flexible support for local affordable housing initiatives.
Understanding all three program types—and the
people and properties they serve—is essential for iden-
tifying community-level opportunities to strengthen,
expand, or supplement affordable housing options.2
The most generous and reliable support for low-
income households comes from federal housing pro-
grams that provide deep, gap-filling rent subsidies.
These programs all pay the difference between a rent
contribution that is considered affordable—currently
set at 30 percent of monthly income—and the actual
rent for a house or apartment. Families receive this
kind of “gap-filling” subsidy if they live in public
housing (owned and managed by a local public hous-
ing agency) or in privately owned developments that
have long-term subsidy contracts with the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). In both cases, the subsidy is “project based”—
attached to the house or apartment; if the family
moves, it loses its subsidy.
Production of these deeply subsidized rental proj-
ects occurred in two overlapping phases. During the
first phase, extending from the 1930s through the
early 1970s, the federal government contracted with
local public housing agencies (PHAs) to build and
manage properties, providing funds to cover both
capital and operating costs.3 In effect, these contracts
required the PHAs to maintain the affordability of
public housing units in perpetuity. During the second
phase, extending from the 1960s to the early 1980s,
the federal government executed contracts directly
with for-profit and nonprofit housing developers,
rather than with PHAs. The terms of contracts gen-
erally guaranteed subsidies and imposed affordability
restrictions for up to 30-year terms.
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Gap-filling subsidies are also available in the form
of federal housing vouchers, which allow families to
rent regular homes and apartments on the private
market. Again, a family contributes 30 percent of
its monthly income and the federal government
pays the rest, up to a locally determined maximum.
Vouchers are unique among federal housing assis-
tance programs in that they are “tenant based” rather
than project based, allowing the recipient rather
than the developer to decide where the low-income
household will live. Voucher recipients can even
receive their assistance in one jurisdiction and take
it to another as they search for housing that best
meets their needs.4
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC)
provide an up-front subsidy to developers of rental
housing (or their equity investors) in return for a
commitment to charge below-market rent levels.
Rents for these units must be set at levels that are
deemed affordable for households with moderately
low income levels for the local area, and the units are
set aside for residents at or below this income ceiling.
All eligible residents pay the same rent; the LIHTC
program does not require (nor does it provide suffi-
cient subsidies to allow) every unit to be affordable
for the family that lives in it.
Every year, the federal government also provides
flexible support for local housing initiatives in the form
of block grants. Specifically, the HOME program
allocates federal dollars by formula to state and local
governments, which can use the money to buy,
build, or rehabilitate rental housing targeted to low-
or moderate-income households. The Community
Development Block Grant program provides formula
funding to the same jurisdictions, and these dollars
can be used to pay for infrastructure and community
facilities (like parks, recreation centers, and street
improvements) that support affordable housing devel-
opment. Housing legislation just passed by Congress
includes a new Affordable Housing Trust Fund, which
(beginning in 2010) will be distributed by formula
to state governments primarily to support the devel-
opment of rental housing that is affordable for very
low income households.5
Scale and Who Is Served
Federal housing assistance programs—though large,
complex, and costly—fall woefully short of meet-
ing the needs of low-income Americans. The total
number of renters facing serious housing hardship
has been steadily rising, and less than a third of eli-
gible households with housing needs actually receive
assistance. In addition, the number of households
receiving deep, gap-filling subsidies (from public
housing, privately owned subsidized housing, or
vouchers) has remained essentially unchanged since
the beginning of this decade, while the number of
homes and apartments with shallower LIHTC sub-
sidies has grown. Information on the characteristics
of households served by federal housing assistance
programs varies considerably across program types,
with much more complete and reliable data avail-
able for the deep subsidy programs than for the newer
(expanding) programs.
Housing Assistance Gap
From 1999 through 2005,6 U.S. housing markets
experienced an unprecedented boom. Changes in
policies and market mechanisms, including a vast
increase in subprime lending, substantially expanded
the number of homeowners, while the number of
renters remained flat. Renters have traditionally expe-
rienced more serious and widespread housing prob-
lems than owners and, accordingly, have been the
intended beneficiaries of the housing assistance pro-
grams described in this primer.
For much of the 20th century, inadequate supply
and deteriorated structures were America’s dominant
housing problems. But, for at least the past 40 years,
the primary problem for renters has been affordability.
By 2005, only 5 percent of renters lived in over-
crowded housing and 11 percent lived in housing
that was structurally inadequate, but 22 percent were
paying from 30 to 50 percent of their income for rent,
and another 23 percent were paying more than half
their income for rent (table 1). Altogether, 14.2 mil-
lion unassisted renter households (42 percent of all
renters) had one or more of these housing problems
in 2005. Between 1999 and 2005, the number with
problems grew 7.7 percent while the number with
no problems declined 9.7 percent.
The fundamental problem is that rents have risen
faster than incomes for a growing segment of the
workforce in almost every part of the country. This
trend is primarily the result of widening income
inequality, with incomes rising much more slowly for
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low- and moderate-wage workers than for those in
high-skill, high-wage jobs. Rising incomes at the top
of the wage ladder put upward pressure on housing
prices and rents, forcing them beyond the reach of
workers in lower-wage jobs. Further, in prosperous
metropolitan areas, new housing construction has
not kept pace with employment and population
growth. Local zoning laws, land use controls, and
other regulatory barriers limit total housing pro-
duction, raise the cost of new units, and prevent the
production of low-cost units. As population expands
in a market with constrained supply, the increased
competition for units causes prices to rise even more
rapidly (Katz and Turner 2008).
Not surprisingly, the extent of housing prob-
lems varies dramatically with income. A household’s
income must fall below 80 percent of the local area
median to be eligible for HUD’s three deep-subsidy
assistance programs.7 In 2005, 23.6 million house-
holds (69 percent of all renters) met this standard
(table 2). Households “with housing needs” are those
that either receive housing assistance or have one or
more housing problems. The vast majority of these
renters are low income (87 percent). Moreover, hous-
ing problems are much more prevalent at the low-
est end of the income ladder. The “extremely low
income” category (less than 30 percent of area median)
is of special importance because it is roughly equiva-
lent to the group in poverty and includes particularly
vulnerable families and individuals—those with high
needs for social services and at risk of homelessness.8
More than 90 percent of renters in the extremely
low income range either receive housing assistance
or suffer from housing problems.
Only 5.5 million (31 percent) of the total 18.0 mil-
lion eligible households with housing needs actually
receive assistance. That number represents just 23 per-
cent of the 23.6 million that are eligible, regardless
of whether they have housing problems. Even among
extremely low income renters, only 34 percent of
those that are eligible receive housing assistance. As of
2005, 12.3 million renter households were families
with children—36 percent of all renters but 40 percent
of those with housing needs and 40 percent of the
extremely low income renters with housing needs.
As of 2005, a total of 1.3 million very low income
families with children were receiving housing assis-
tance, while another 2.3 million had housing prob-
lems but received no assistance.
Because the availability of housing assistance falls
so far short of needs, waiting lists for public housing,
privately owned subsidized projects, and vouchers are
all long. In fact, eligible households typically have
to wait years before they reach the top of a waiting
list for subsidized housing. Unfortunately, however,
waiting lists do not provide reliable information about
the number or characteristics of households in need.
Many PHAs maintain separate waiting lists for public
housing and vouchers, neighboring jurisdictions have
their own lists, the owners of privately owned sub-
T A B L E  1
Total U.S. Households, Tenure, and Renter Problems, 1999–2005
1999 2005 % change
Households (millions)
Total households 102.8 108.9 5.9
Owner households 68.8 75.0 8.9
Renter households 34.0 34.0 (0.2)
Assisted 6.2 6.5 5.5
Unassisted with problems 13.1 14.2 7.7
Unassisted no problems 14.7 13.2 (9.7)
Percent of renters with housing problems
Rent burden > 50% of income 19 23 4.7
Rent burden 30–50% of income 21 22 1.1
Severely inadequate housing 4 3 (0.4)
Moderately inadequate housing 8 8 (0.6)
Crowded housing 5 5 (0.1)
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2007a).
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sidized projects keep lists, and households in need
can put their names on multiple lists. In addition,
most PHAs and private providers close their wait-
ing lists when they exceed the number of units
likely to become available within the next two or
three years. These lists are then briefly opened to
accept new applications and only occasionally purged
to delete the names of people who have left the
area, are no longer eligible, or have found some
other solution.
Considerable information is available about the
demographic characteristics of households
served by HUD’s three deep, gap-filling subsidy
programs (table 3). In 2007, 1.05 million lived in
public housing, 1.97 million received vouchers,
and 1.29 million lived in privately owned subsidized
units—a total of 4.30 million.9 This number falls
considerably below the 6.5 million eligibles shown
in the “assisted column” as of 2005 on the earlier table,
probably because many families benefiting under one
of the shallower subsidy programs (like LIHTC) iden-
tify themselves as being “assisted.”10
All three deep-subsidy programs target assistance
to the poorest households among those eligible. About
three-quarters of the beneficiaries are extremely
low income, and 90 percent (or more) are very low
income. Mean annual incomes fall in a narrow range
between $11,056 (privately owned subsidized hous-
ing) and $12,715 (public housing). Other characteris-
tics, however, show some differences of note. Families
with children make up a larger share of voucher
holders (54 percent) than of public housing residents
(41 percent) or residents in privately owned subsidized
projects (33 percent). In the privately owned projects,
elderly and disabled people account for the largest
share of residents. The racial/ethnic mix is similar for
public housing residents and voucher holders, with
African Americans constituting the largest share
(46 and 43 percent, respectively), followed by whites
(29 and 36 percent, respectively), and Hispanics con-
stituting considerably smaller shares (23 and 17 per-
cent, respectively). In contrast, half the residents of
privately owned subsidized projects are white, and
only a third are African American.11
T A B L E  2
Renters and Renter Families with Children, Assistance and Housing Problem Status, 2005
Households with Housing Needs
Unassisted Unassisted, 
Total Total Assisted with problems no problems
Renters (millions) 34.0 20.7 6.5 14.2 13.2
> 80% of median 10.4 2.8 1.0 1.8 7.6
Low income 23.6 18.0 5.5 12.4 5.6
50–80% of median 7.5 3.8 1.0 2.8 3.7
30–50% of median 6.3 5.2 1.3 4.0 1.1
0–30% of median 9.7 8.9 3.3 5.6 0.8
Percent of renters 100 100 100 100 100
Low income 69 87 85 88 42
50–80% of median 22 18 15 20 28
30–50% of median 19 25 19 28 9
0–30% of median 29 43 50 40 6
Renter families with children (millions) 12.3 8.2 2.6 5.6 4.1
> 50% of median 5.8 2.4 0.8 1.6 3.4
30–50% of median 2.7 2.2 0.5 1.7 0.4
0–30% of median 3.8 3.6 1.3 2.3 0.2
Families with children as percent of renters 36 40 39 40 31
> 50% of median 32 37 39 36 30
30–50% of median 42 43 42 43 39
0–30% of median 39 40 38 41 29
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2007a).
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Many people assume that residents of subsidized
housing seldom move. But in fact, the median length
of stay in public housing is only 4.7 years, and the
median voucher household receives assistance for
3.1 years. The elderly and disabled groups stay the
longest; the medians for families with children are
only 3.2 years in public housing and 2.6 years in
the voucher program. Interestingly, working families
(defined as those with more than half their income
coming from wages) stay longer on average than those
that depend primarily on welfare. Despite the relatively
short average tenures, a sizeable minority of public
housing residents stay much longer. Specifically,
20 percent of families with children (nonelderly and
nondisabled) in public housing have lived there
8.9 years or longer (Lubell 2008).
Trends in Program Size and 
the Location of Assisted Housing
Public housing was launched in 1937, and most of its
inventory was built by the mid-1970s. The programs
offering deep subsidies in privately owned properties
began producing units in the 1960s, accelerated after
1974, when the most generous of these programs
was established, but were drastically curtailed by the
Reagan administration in the early 1980s. Vouchers,
also introduced in 1974, have provided the main
vehicle for expanding deep subsidy assistance since
the early 1980s, but the LIHTC program has grown
even more rapidly since it began in 1987. Figure 1
shows trends for each group of programs since the
mid-1990s.
By the 1980s, some of the public housing stock
was deteriorating badly, but little funding was pro-
vided for renovation, and a rigid “one-for-one re-
placement” rule essentially prevented demolition
and redevelopment by requiring construction of a
new public housing unit for every unit removed
from the stock. Circumstances changed with the
introduction in 1993 of the HOPE VI program,
which provides funds to demolish severely distressed
projects and replace them with mixed-income de-
velopments.12 Generally, HOPE VI has built fewer
new public housing units than were torn down,
and associated initiatives have allowed the demolition
T A B L E  3
Characteristics of Housing Assistance Recipients
Public housing Vouchers Private subsidized
Total units under lease March 2007 (thousands) 1,045 1,970 1,286
Percent by income relative to area median
81% or higher 2 — 1
51–80% 8 3 3
31–50% 18 19 21
30% or lower 72 77 75
Mean income ($) 12,715 12,411 11,056
Percent by household type
Elderly, no children 29 17 49
Nonelderly, disabled, no children 16 19 17
Other, no children 14 9 1
Families with children 41 54 33
Percent by race and ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 29 36 50
Black, non-Hispanic 46 43 32
Hispanic 23 17 13
Asian or Pacific Islander 2 3 4
Native American — 1 1
Sources: Total units under lease from HUD (2007b). Characteristics of public housing and voucher beneficiaries from HUD Resident
Characteristics Report for June 2008. Characteristics of residents of privately owned subsidized housing from HUD TRACS report for
June 2008.
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or sale of other deteriorated projects without re-
placement. The estimated result of these changes
was a decline of about 140,000 public housing units
between 1995 and 2007, reducing the total stock
from 1.33 million to 1.19 million units.13 As figure
1 shows, the number of households living in pub-
lic housing dropped from 1.14 million in 1993 to
1.05 million in 2007.14
The number of households receiving vouchers
grew substantially during the 1990s and through the
early years of this decade, in part because PHAs
received extra vouchers to relocate public housing
residents displaced by HOPE VI. More recently,
however, federal budget pressures have curtailed any
further expansion of the voucher program. Altogether,
the total number of voucher holders grew from
1.20 million in 1993 to 1.97 million in 2007, a 64 per-
cent increase in 14 years.
Almost no units have been added to the stock
of privately owned subsidized units since the early
1980s,15 but units are being removed from this inven-
tory. As discussed earlier, these projects receive assis-
tance under multiyear contracts between the private
owners and HUD. When those contracts expire, they
are often renewed, but owners can also “opt out” at
that point. Especially in markets where property
values are rising or the surrounding neighborhood is
in particular demand, owners may have strong finan-
cial incentives to let their subsidy commitments expire.
Estimates indicate that the number of households
living in these assisted properties has dropped from
1.72 million in 1993 to 1.29 million by 2007, a decline
of 25 percent over 14 years.
Taken together, growth in the voucher program
over the past decade and a half has been almost
completely offset by the loss of deep, project-based
subsidies. The total number of households receiving
deep, gap-filling assistance increased only 6 percent—
from 4.06 million in 1993 to 4.30 million in 2007—
despite the vast expansion in needs discussed earlier.
In contrast, the LIHTC program, which began in
1987, reached a cumulative total of 430,000 units in
1995 and then expanded to 1.53 million in 2005, an
increase of 356 percent over a decade.
Although federally subsidized housing can be found
in city, suburban, and nonmetropolitan communities
all over the country, it is disproportionately located
in central cities. Public housing in particular is con-
centrated in poor, inner-city neighborhoods in the
northeast and midwest (table 4).16 When public hous-
ing was first introduced, it primarily targeted the older
industrial cities of the northeast and midwest, where
housing problems were severe. The younger, grow-
ing cities of the west received relatively little public
housing, and California actually banned the construc-
tion of public housing. Accordingly, only 9 percent
1.14 1.20
1.72
0.43
1.05
1.97
1.29
1.53
Public housing Tax credit
(LIHTC)
1995199319931993
Privately owned
subsidized
Vouchers
2005200720072007
F I G U R E  1
Change in Households Assisted: Major Housing Assistance Programs (millions of assisted households)
Sources: For first three programs, 1993 data from HUD (1997b) and 2007 data from HUD (2007b); for LIHTC, phone interview with
Michael Hollar, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 2008.
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of the public housing stock is located in the west,
compared with 24 percent of all rental units. Vouch-
ers and privately owned subsidized housing are more
evenly spread across the regions, more nearly in pro-
portion to the rental stock overall. Public housing also
stands out in that it is much more concentrated in
central cities (61 percent) than the other two deep-
subsidy programs and is more concentrated than the
overall stock of rental housing.
The distribution of these programs across differ-
ent types of neighborhoods highlights what is among
the most serious flaws in U.S. housing programs.
Federal housing policy has actually fueled the prob-
lem of concentrated minority poverty, through the
siting of public housing in neighborhoods that are
predominantly black and poor. Today, more than
half of public housing residents live in high-poverty
neighborhoods (with poverty rates above 30 percent),
while only 8 percent live in low-poverty neighbor-
hoods (poverty rates below 10 percent). The record
is better for privately owned subsidized projects
(22 percent in high-poverty neighborhoods) and
better yet for vouchers (15 percent in high-poverty
neighborhoods), but even these levels raise serious
concerns given the high cost of concentrated poverty
for families and for the nation as a whole (Ellen and
Turner 1997).
Emerging evidence suggests that the newer forms
of affordable rental housing production are still
reinforcing concentrated poverty in inner-city neigh-
borhoods, although not to the same degree as public
housing. A recent analysis of the tax credit program’s
performance in the 1990s revealed that central cities
(where, again, poverty rates are much higher than the
national or suburban average) received a dispropor-
tionate share of the units (Freeman 2004). Central
cities housed 58 percent of all metropolitan tax credit
units built during the 1990s despite the fact that they
contain only 38 percent of metropolitan residents.
At the neighborhood level, the spatial distribution
of tax credit housing presents a mixed picture. As of
2000, the average tax credit unit was located in a
census tract with a poverty rate of 19 percent. Among
central-city units, the average tract poverty rate was
higher (24 percent)—but not as high as the tracts
where other types of federally subsidized rental units
are located (average poverty rate of 29 percent).
Comparable detail on the spatial distribution of
HOME units is not available, but the patterns appear
to be similar. As of the late 1990s, the average tract
poverty rate for HOME-funded rental projects in
cities and urban counties was 27 percent. The average
within central cities was even higher—31 percent
(Walker et al. 1998). These figures should not be
surprising. Community development corporations
build affordable rental housing in the neighborhoods
they serve both because that is what the federal gov-
ernment pays for and because they believe that hous-
ing production stimulates neighborhood revitalization.
They rarely question the wisdom of consigning low-
T A B L E  4
Location of Housing Assistance Units and All Rental Units, Mid-1990s (%)
Assisted Housing
Public housing Vouchers Private subsidized All rental units
Region
Northeast 31 22 25 22
Midwest 21 22 27 22
South 39 33 33 33
West 9 23 15 24
Location type
Central city 61 45 47 45
Suburbs 19 34 33 38
Nonmetropolitan 20 21 20 17
Neighborhood poverty rate
< 10 percent 8 28 27 42
10–29 percent 39 58 51 45
30+ percent 54 15 22 13
Source: Newman and Schnare (1997).
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income families to neighborhoods that do not offer
what most middle-class families seek in their housing:
good schools, proximity to quality jobs, and quality
services.
Roles of State and Local 
Housing Agencies
The administration of federal housing assistance is
complex and confusing, with funds for various pro-
grams flowing independently of one another to state
housing finance agencies (Low Income Housing Tax
Credits), local public housing authorities (public
housing and vouchers), private owners (developments
with federal subsidy contracts), and state and local
departments of housing and community develop-
ment (HOME and CDBG block grants). And cities
typically have distinct agencies for the separate but
overlapping tasks of housing finance, housing pro-
duction, housing preservation, housing regulation,
public housing administration, community develop-
ment, neighborhood redevelopment, planning and
zoning, and other special initiatives. This balkani-
zation of administration makes it difficult for local
communities to plan effectively, to allocate scarce
resources strategically, or even systematically assess
unmet needs.
Typically, the executive director of a local PHA does
not report directly to the city’s mayor, but rather
to a board of directors, some of whose members are
appointed by the mayor. Some jurisdictions have
made their PHAs part of the local housing department,
with more explicit accountability to the mayor. How-
ever, even in these cases, federal rules control most
aspects of program administration, and local policy-
makers often perceive public housing and vouchers
as outside their control.
In Washington, D.C., for example, seven sepa-
rate organizations are significantly involved in
affordable housing production and administra-
tion—the Department of Housing and Commu-
nity Development, the Housing Finance Agency,
the District of Columbia Housing Authority, the
National Capital Revitalization Corporation, the
Housing Production Trust Fund, and the Deputy
Mayor for Planning and Economic Development—
and no single individual or entity has the author-
ity to coordinate or hold them all accountable.
In Baltimore, the city’s department of housing and
community development and its PHA were con-
solidated into a single agency, called Baltimore
Housing, whose director is appointed by the
mayor. In contrast, Atlanta’s PHA operates inde-
pendently of the city’s department of housing and
community development, with the chief executive
officer accountable not to the mayor but to a board
of commissioners composed of local business
and civic leaders.
Public housing is built, owned, and operated by
local autonomous bodies called public housing
authorities (PHAs), established for the express
purpose of administering the federal public housing
program. These PHAs also administer the housing
voucher program. Most PHAs rely primarily (or even
exclusively) on the federal government for funding
and must adhere to federal rules and procedures.17
Because PHAs are agencies of local government,
most metropolitan regions have several PHAs, serv-
ing different jurisdictions. This complicates voucher
program operations because (at least in principle)
recipients can use their vouchers anywhere, regard-
less of which jurisdiction issued them. But voucher
portability is hindered by the red tape involved in
transferring families (and subsidy resources) from one
PHA to another. Finally, not all jurisdictions have
PHAs; communities without PHAs have no public
housing, but state-level PHAs generally administer
federal housing vouchers in these areas.
HUD directly funds and monitors the operation
of privately owned properties that receive deep
federal subsidies. Each property maintains its own
waiting lists, selects eligible residents, and reports to
HUD. Local government exercises no authority or
control over these properties. However, as subsidy
contracts with HUD expire, many communities face
the problem of losing affordable housing and helping
low-income families at risk of displacement. There-
fore, local housing departments are getting involved in
providing new subsidies to some of these properties,
most often using some combination of HOME funds,
the LIHTC, and local resources.
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Low income housing tax credits are distributed
among states by formula and then allocated to partic-
ular development projects by state housing finance
agencies (HFAs). State HFAs must prepare and pub-
lish allocation plans, specifying criteria for awarding
credits, and prospective project developers compete
to receive them. LIHTC projects can be developed
(and then owned and operated) by for-profit compa-
nies, nonprofits, and public agencies, including PHAs.
And some states’ allocation plans give priority to pro-
posed projects that are endorsed by local governments.
However, once tax credits have been awarded, their
developers typically operate them independently,
with very limited oversight from the state HFA and
the federal Treasury Department (HUD has no role
in either funding or oversight of LIHTC projects).
Like the privately owned properties with deep fed-
eral subsidies, LIHTC properties maintain separate
waiting lists and tenant selection procedures. Local
government agencies may not even be aware of where
all these properties are.
CDBG and HOME block grants flow from HUD
to local housing and community development
departments. Big cities and urban counties are clas-
sified as “entitlement jurisdictions” under these pro-
grams and receive funding by formula. Typically,
responsibility for using HOME and CDBG funding
falls to the local department of housing and com-
munity development, whose director reports to the
mayor. These agencies use the block grant funds
to support locally designed and operated programs,
including programs that provide grants or loans to
developers of affordable rental housing, often in con-
junction with the LIHTC. HUD provides separate
allocations of both HOME and CDBG funding 
to states for distribution among “nonentitlement
jurisdictions.”18
HUD requires jurisdictions that receive HOME
funding to prepare affordable housing plans. These
plans document the magnitude of housing prob-
lems among low- and moderate-income households,
describe the distribution of hardship across different
income levels and household types, and estimate the
size of special needs populations. Jurisdictions then
present the city’s strategy for using available resources
to tackle these housing needs. At its best, this planning
mandate (which includes requirements for public
participation) creates a real opportunity for engage-
ment and strategic thinking. And some jurisdictions
use it very effectively to guide the allocation of fed-
eral, state, and city resources. At its worst, however,
the planning requirement amounts to little more
than a paper exercise, because HUD does not in fact
evaluate the local plans or require jurisdictions to
adhere to them (Turner et al. 2002).
An assessment of the consolidated planning
process conducted almost a decade ago found
that the city of San Francisco was using the
process effectively by engaging public and 
private-sector stakeholders to decide strategically
about the allocation of federal, state, and local
housing resources in a very challenging market
environment. In Atlanta, on the other hand, the
HUD-mandated process was conducted sepa-
rately from an ongoing local planning process.
And San Antonio housing planners were frus-
trated that the HUD-mandated plan had no teeth
and that the real decisions about resource alloca-
tion occurred through an entirely separate politi-
cal process (Turner et al. 2002).
Current Public Housing Initiatives
Two current initiatives give selected PHAs extra
resources and flexibility to better meet the needs of
the households and communities they serve. HOPE
VI funds the demolition and replacement of severely
distressed public housing developments, with the goal
of improving outcomes for residents and revitalizing
neighborhoods. Moving to Work (MTW) essentially
deregulates participating PHAs so they can experiment
with new subsidy formulas and occupancy rules that
offer promise for encouraging and supporting work.
Much of the current policy debate about public hous-
ing revolves around these two initiatives; both are
controversial.
The first, and probably best known, is the
HOPE VI program, an ambitious effort launched
in the early 1990s to demolish the worst public hous-
ing projects in the country and replace them with
housing that is better designed and built, less dense,
more economically mixed, and better integrated
into the fabric of surrounding neighborhoods and
city economies. HOPE VI grants are competitively
awarded to PHAs for the demolition and redevelop-
ment of particular projects and include funding for
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supportive services to help residents make the transi-
tion to work as well as supplemental housing vouch-
ers for resident relocation.
The new housing developments produced under
HOPE VI differ dramatically from earlier genera-
tions of public housing. Not only are they generally
well constructed, but the best among them have
applied the latest thinking on housing and neigh-
borhood design. Income mixing is a central feature of
many HOPE VI sites. The expectation is that prop-
erties that have to attract and retain higher-income
tenants will be better managed and maintained over
time, and that a mix of income levels creates a health-
ier social environment and brings better services—
especially schools—to the surrounding neighborhood.
Therefore, redeveloped sites typically combine public
housing units (with long-term, gap-filling subsidy
commitments) with LIHTC units and market-rate
rental and for-sale housing. As a consequence, the
total number of public housing units (affordable for
the poorest households) is usually smaller after re-
development than before.
The new developments are leveraging substantial
public, private, and philanthropic resources—resources
that were virtually absent (and, in some cases, pro-
hibited) from former public housing developments.
PHAs are also experimenting with a range of man-
agement approaches: many have employed private
property management firms on site (and at risk) rather
than relying on bureaucratic public agencies. And in
many cities, HOPE VI has led to new (and lasting)
partnerships between PHAs, other city agencies, non-
profit organizations, and private-sector leaders.
crime and joblessness and substantial increases in
income, property values, and market investment. In
several high-profile developments, HOPE VI invest-
ments have been accompanied by significant improve-
ments in the quality of the local school and the
educational performance of low-income children.
With some of these findings, of course, cause and
effect are not entirely clear.
The quality of many of the new HOPE VI devel-
opments appears to be helping catalyze significant
improvements in the surrounding neighborhoods.
Case studies show substantial declines in neighborhood
Louisville’s Park DuValle involved active mayoral
leadership from the outset, leveraged funding
from numerous sources, and ultimately engaged
multiple city agencies (as well as private investors)
in reconfiguring streets; redeveloping parks, play-
grounds, and community centers; reconstituting
public schools; and developing new retail shop-
ping facilities.
Jefferson Elementary School (located near the
Murphy Park housing project) was among the
worst in St. Louis, but most children in the project
did not attend it. Under a court-ordered deseg-
regation plan, three-quarters of the neighborhood
children were bused to schools elsewhere in the
county. After the public housing was demolished
and replaced, Jefferson Elementary reopened as
a neighborhood-based school with a community
advisory board that had the authority to hire the
principal. It has seen significant gains in test
scores and is now the school of choice for most
children living in the surrounding neighborhood,
including those in the redeveloped public housing.
It also serves as a neighborhood learning center,
offering classes and activities for adults as well as
children during evenings and weekends.
Relatively few of the original residents from
“HOPE-VI’d” projects are returning to live in the
new mixed-income developments. Instead, most are
relocating with housing vouchers or to other, tradi-
tional public housing developments. Several factors
contribute to the low rates of return among the orig-
inal residents, including reductions in the total num-
ber of public housing units, delays in the completion
of the new developments, and tougher screening
criteria and occupancy requirements for residents,
but also satisfaction among many voucher recipients
with their private-market homes or apartments. In
general, voucher relocatees enjoy better housing and
neighborhood conditions than when they lived in
public housing and are very satisfied. However, there
is no evidence that they are making significant progress
toward economic security or self-sufficiency. And
households relocated to other public housing proj-
ects generally live in conditions that are as bad—or
worse—than their original developments.19
Over the past 15 years, HOPE VI has invested
$6.1 billion of federal funding for 235 projects, to
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demolish 96,200 public housing units and produce
107,800 new or renovated housing units, 56,800
of which will be affordable to the lowest-income
households (through September 2007, 88,100 units
had been demolished but only 64,300 new units had
been constructed under the HOPE VI program).
The Bush administration repeatedly proposed to end
the program, arguing that it is too costly and that
most of the severely distressed stock has now been
demolished. Advocates for low-income households
have been especially critical of the program because
it has displaced original residents and reduced the
total stock of housing with deep, project-based sub-
sidies. Nonetheless, bipartisan congressional support
has sustained the HOPE VI program, although at
much lower levels of annual funding than during
earlier years.20
Legislation to reauthorize and revamp HOPE VI
has been under discussion for several years, and in Jan-
uary 2008, the House of Representatives approved
the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2007 (H.R. 3524). This bill calls for more help for
families using vouchers to relocate (especially those
with serious personal and health problems), a contin-
ued commitment to mixed-income redevelopment,
full replacement of all public housing units demolished
with either public housing or project-based vouchers,
and production of some replacement housing in low-
poverty areas (Sard and Staub 2008). The Senate ver-
sion of reauthorization is similar in many respects, but
it does not include the requirement that every unit of
public housing demolished must be replaced. Advo-
cates for the extension of HOPE VI are divided about
whether the 100 percent replacement requirement is
necessary or whether it might make some redevelop-
ment projects financially infeasible. As of September
2008, HOPE VI reauthorization legislation is not
expected to be enacted in 2008 but will probably be
reintroduced in the next Congress.
The Moving to Work demonstration (MTW)
was enacted in 1996 to allow a limited number of
PHAs to experiment with “deregulation.” More
specifically, selected PHAs could request waivers
of federal statutes and rules governing both public
housing and vouchers in order to design and test new
approaches for reducing program costs, encouraging
economic self-sufficiency of residents, and increasing
the housing choices of low-income families. Some
participating PHAs were also granted the option of
pooling three major streams of funding from HUD—
public housing operating funds, public housing
modernization funds, and voucher subsidy funding.
Currently, 27 PHAs participate in MTW.21 Many
have experimented with strategies for encouraging
work and economic advancement among assisted
households (including both public housing and
voucher families) by imposing work requirements,
changing the way rent subsidies are calculated, and
even limiting the number of years a family can receive
assistance.22 Much of this experimentation reflects
an assumption that the standard subsidy calculation
(which requires households to contribute 30 percent
of their income toward rent) discourages work by
“taxing” every additional dollar of income and by
buffering the effects of a drop in earnings. For exam-
ple, several PHAs completely severed the link between
income and rent contribution, establishing flat rents
or “stepped rents,” whereby a household’s rent con-
tribution is set at a flat amount in the first year and then
increased by predetermined amounts on a schedule
that spans several years. Other PHAs continued to
calculate rent contributions as a percent of income
but modified their procedures to delay rent increases
or exclude some income from the rent calculation.
Many agencies required all households to pay a min-
imum rent contribution, regardless of how low their
incomes fell, with minimum rents ranging from
$25 to $200. And several PHAs required residents to
engage in some kind of work or training activity as
a condition of occupancy (Abravanel et al. 2004).
Eight PHAs actually imposed time limits on
housing assistance, arguing that this approach creates
the strongest possible incentive for residents to
increase their work effort and that it also spreads scarce
assistance resources to more needy households over
time. The very limited information available about the
effects of these policies on residents suggests that they
motivated some but paralyzed others, and that many
families lacked a clear understanding of what it would
take to be able to afford housing in the private mar-
ket (Miller et al. 2007).
Unfortunately, although a considerable amount is
now known about what PHAs did with the flexibility
allowed under MTW, almost nothing is known about
whether they produced better (or perhaps worse)
outcomes for families than standard federal poli-
cies. Although MTW is called a demonstration, it
was neither designed nor implemented with rigorous
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evaluation as an objective so outcomes and impacts
of new procedures could credibly be determined.
An assessment of the first group of participating sites
found some evidence of increased employment and
rising incomes among affected residents (and no evi-
dence of extreme hardship). Interestingly, however,
there was no clear relationship between the types
of work incentives and supports introduced and the
magnitude of employment gains. This raises ques-
tions about whether the employment gains could be
attributed to the policy changes, but it also suggests
that any policies and practices that encourage resi-
dents to find and keep jobs have at least some effect
(Abravanel et al. 2004).
Provisions that would substantially expand Mov-
ing to Work were passed by the House of Represen-
tatives in 2007 as part of a larger bill (H.R. 1851)
focusing on reforms to the voucher program. Specifi-
cally, the House bill would rename MTW the Hous-
ing Innovation Program and allow up to 80 PHAs to
participate, still without any systematic data collection
or rigorous evaluation (Fischer and Sard 2008). Par-
allel legislation introduced in the Senate did not
include this provision. Although the voucher reform
legislation is not expected to be enacted in 2008,
pressure from PHAs to expand MTW are likely to
continue. Some advocacy organizations oppose the
expansion of MTW on the grounds that it puts
vulnerable residents at risk of hardship and even dis-
placement and that the experimentation by PHAs is
unmonitored and unevaluated. They argue that, if
MTW is expanded, the number of PHAs authorized
to participate should be smaller, and more rigorous
evaluation should be mandated.
Critical Policy Challenges 
and Choices
Until the onset of current foreclosure crisis, hous-
ing received scant attention on the domestic policy
agenda. Even today, the problems of housing avail-
ability, adequacy, and affordability facing low-income
renters are largely neglected. Increasingly, however,
practitioners, policymakers, and advocates outside
traditional housing policy circles are recognizing that
decent and affordable rental housing is a key ingre-
dient essential to other priority goals, including fam-
ily economic success, children’s well-being, smart
growth, and equitable development.
As a consequence, some local and state govern-
ments are taking steps to boost incomes among low-
wage workers (so more working families can afford
prevailing rent levels), address the regulatory barriers
that stand in the way of rental housing production,
and raise new funds to subsidize affordable rental
housing (Katz and Turner 2008). On the income side,
a growing number of states are enacting minimum
wages higher than the federal standard, some of them
significantly so.23 And many now have their own
earned income tax credit programs, which—like the
federal program—supplement the incomes of workers
with a refundable year-end tax credit (Nagle and
Johnson 2006). On the regulatory side, more than
130 localities nationwide have taken steps to man-
date the production of affordable housing through
inclusionary zoning ordinances.24 And on the sub-
sidy side, 37 states and more than 350 counties and
cities have established dedicated sources of public
revenue (like taxes and fees) to create housing trust
funds for the production and preservation of afford-
able housing (Goodno 2002). All these state and
local initiatives have value, but their potential impact
is limited in the absence of federal policy leadership.
New Vision for Federal Housing Policy
Federal rental housing programs can claim credit
for some important accomplishments, but they now
suffer from serious failures of design, scale, and imple-
mentation. Their most significant shortcoming is
reflected in the widening gap between housing needs
and subsidy resources. In addition, programs that
produce new rental housing continue to focus on
inner-city neighborhoods—further concentrating
poverty rather than expanding access to opportunity.
And the federal government offers few incentives for
states and localities to remove the regulatory barriers
that raise housing production costs and distort the
location of affordable rental housing.
No one level of government can tackle today’s
complex rental housing challenges on its own. But a
meaningful strategy would have to start with a more
vigorous and systematic federal role, because only the
federal government has the fiscal capacity to address
the consequences of stagnant wage growth and income
inequality nationwide. As long as incomes for a sub-
stantial segment of the population fall short of what
it takes to cover the costs of producing and operating
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adequate housing, state and local governments sim-
ply cannot afford to close the affordability gap for
enough households. Therefore, federal policies should
expand assistance that addresses the demand side of
the housing affordability equation—using such tools
as a higher minimum wage, supplements to the earned
income tax credit, and an expanded housing voucher
program—so more low-income households have
sufficient income to make adequate housing afford-
able (Acs and Turner 2008; Dreier 2007; Katz and
Turner 2008). Then, state and local jurisdictions
could assume lead responsibility for the remaining,
supply-side challenges, providing both regulatory and
financial inducements for private-market actors (both
for-profit and nonprofit) to produce and maintain
moderately priced rental housing.
Under this basic framework, the federal govern-
ment would still have to create incentives for states
and local jurisdictions to reduce regulatory barriers
that unnecessarily constrain supply and inflate costs.
One possible strategy would be to require existing
metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) to pre-
pare regional housing strategies that complement
the regional transportation plans already mandated
by federal law. Local jurisdictions could then be
required to align their expenditures of federal block
grant funds and their use of LIHTC with these
regional strategies (Katz and Turner 2008).
This vision has not yet garnered wide attention or
discussion, although it may provide a framework for
debate if a new federal administration focuses serious
attention on the problem of rental housing afford-
ability. And whether or not federal policies begin to
move in this direction, major questions remain about
how existing programs and resources might play a
more constructive role in the well-being of assisted
families and the vitality of communities. Local practi-
tioners, advocates, and philanthropies are increasingly
interested in exploring strategies that link housing
assistance with other high-priority social goals, includ-
ing work and earnings, children’s well-being, and
environmental sustainability.
Housing Assistance 
and Family Economic Success
A growing body of evidence suggests that living in
decent, affordable housing may provide a “platform”
from which low-income families can get jobs, build
their incomes, and achieve financial security. Simply
living in decent, affordable housing constitutes a criti-
cal support for work because families living in un-
affordable housing are financially insecure, vulnerable
to unexpected increases in other costs, and more likely
to move frequently (Mills et al. 2006). This insecurity
may make it more difficult for them to get and keep
jobs, work extra hours, or advance to higher wages. In
addition, the extra income freed up when housing is
affordable may enable families to pay for reliable child
care, transportation to a better job, additional training,
or professional clothing—all investments that can
enhance employment success. Several recent studies
suggest that people who receive assistance to make
their housing costs affordable are more likely to bene-
fit from workforce or welfare-to-work programs than
people without assistance. Thus, affordable housing
may buttress social programs that encourage work and
self-sufficiency (Newman and Harkness 2006; Sard
and Lubell 2000; Sard and Springer 2002; Sard and
Waller 2002). To date, however, there is no evidence
that housing assistance alone leads to greater employ-
ment or higher incomes (Mills et al. 2006).
Variations in the design and implementation of
rental assistance programs can enhance their impact
on employment and incomes among recipients. The
Jobs-Plus Initiative rigorously tested the effective-
ness of saturating a public housing development with
high-quality work supports and changing rent rules
and subsidy formulas to encourage work. Resident
earnings rose significantly (compared with residents
living in comparable public housing developments)
from a combination of higher employment rates
and higher wages (Bloom, Riccio, and Verma 2005;
Turner and Rawlings 2005). As discussed earlier,
PHAs participating in the MTW initiative have also
experimented with changes in rent rules, occupancy
requirements, and support services, but insufficient
research has been conducted to rigorously assess the
effectiveness of these efforts. If MTW is continued
or expanded, adding a rigorous evaluation mandate
could provide a valuable opportunity to learn more
about what works in this area.
PHAs have traditionally played a very limited
role in providing supportive services, even though
their residents have some of the greatest service
needs of any group in the United States. Many pub-
lic housing officials argue that their job is to provide
decent housing and that is all they have been funded
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to do. In principle, PHAs can use part of their
administrative budgets for services, but their posi-
tion has been that the size of those budgets is insuf-
ficient to cover their costs in housing management,
let alone take on a broader service agenda. Accord-
ingly, most services that have been provided have
been funded through special programs. Important
examples in the early 1990s were the Drug Elimi-
nation Program (now discontinued) and Family Self-
Sufficiency, which has operated primarily in the
voucher program.
The Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program pro-
vides case management that arranges for services
aimed primarily to help participants find jobs, build
assets, clean up credit histories, and take other steps
to increase their incomes. Participants also have the
chance to build savings as their incomes increase.
Specifically, their rents go up with their incomes, but
the program places the additional amounts they owe
in rent into an escrow account for their benefit. They
can access the funds only after they have successfully
graduated from the program. At least 75,000 house-
holds participate in FSS; 67,500 in the voucher pro-
gram and 7,500 in public housing. HUD funding
compensates PHAs for the amounts placed in escrow
and provides about $48 million annually for FSS
coordinators. And voucher recipients who receive
employment counseling and case management services
under the Family Self-Sufficiency program appear to
achieve significant employment and earnings gains
(Lubell 2008). Working with HUD or with individ-
ual PHAs to identify and implement best practices
in the FSS program could improve outcomes for
voucher families.
Because of its visibility, HOPE VI highlighted
the service needs of the troubled original residents
who had to be relocated. Funding was provided to
address the need in HOPE VI project budgets, but
this was a new venture for most housing authorities,
and the results were mixed at best (Popkin et al. 2004).
Still, the HOPE VI experience broadened recogni-
tion of the need, particularly for services oriented to
“helping families move to self-sufficiency.” Congress
explicitly endorsed this theme in its landmark Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 and
authorized a new grant program, Resident Oppor-
tunities for Supportive Services (ROSS) (Solomon
2005).
ROSS funding covers several programmatic com-
ponents, including an FSS-like program for public
housing residents. However, appropriations have thus
far been quite small (under $50 million annually).25
HUD’s current strategy recognizes that it is unlikely
that funds for all service needs for public housing res-
idents will (or should) flow through the HUD budget.
Rather, the emphasis should be on using HUD funds
primarily to hire ROSS service coordinators who will
in turn arrange for appropriate packages of services
with existing local providers. The services should
“enable participating families to increase earned
income, reduce or eliminate the need for welfare
assistance, make progress toward achieving economic
self-sufficiency, or, in the case of elderly and disabled
residents, help improve living conditions and enable
residents to age in place.”26 If ROSS is sustained and
expanded, it may offer an opportunity for new local
partnerships that more effectively link public hous-
ing residents with high-quality services. The success
of this kind of linking strategy depends, however, on
the availability and quality of local services.
Some research suggests that, over time, employ-
ment and earnings may increase among families
who receive a housing vouchers plus housing search
assistance to help them move from high-poverty,
distressed neighborhoods to communities of opportu-
nity. Over the long term, participants in the Chicago
Gautreaux demonstration who moved to majority-
white, resource-rich communities in the suburbs
were more likely to work, earned more, and were
less reliant on public assistance than similar families
who remained in city neighborhoods. However,
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration,
which more rigorously tests the impacts of moving
A family with an income of $500 a month pays
$150 in rent to live in public housing or a rental unit
assisted by a voucher. If the family’s income rises
to $750 a month, the monthly rent obligation
would increase to $225. An FSS participant
would still have to pay $225 in rent, but the 
$75 increase would be deposited each month in
an escrow account. If the family maintained this
level of earnings, its account would have a bal-
ance of at least $4,500 after five years. Families
receive the full value of their escrow accounts
upon successful completion of their FSS action
plan (Cramer 2004).
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out of high-poverty neighborhoods in five cities,
so far finds no effects on employment or earnings
(Cove et al. 2008). This may be because most MTO
families moved to low-poverty central-city jurisdic-
tions rather than to job-rich suburban communities,
or because few remained in their new neighborhoods
long enough to benefit.27 Future efforts to promote
economic success among voucher families should
focus on helping them move to locations that offer
good access to jobs, supplementing mobility assis-
tance with employment counseling and work supports
(potentially using FSS resources), and (in MTW sites)
experimenting with modifications to the voucher
subsidy formula to explicitly reward work and earn-
ings gains.
Housing Assistance and 
the Well-Being of Poor Children
There are good reasons to think that living in assisted
housing should contribute to improved outcomes
for children in low-income families. In particular,
affordable rent payments should increase a family’s
residential stability, reducing the frequency of in-
voluntary moves, evictions, and homelessness; res-
idential instability is known to undermine children’s
well-being (Lovell and Isaacs 2008; Rhodes 2005;
Rumberger 2003). And spending less for housing may
enable families to spend more of their very limited
budgets on food and other necessities for their chil-
dren. Indeed, recent evidence confirms that vouchers
reduce the likelihood that welfare families will double
up or experience homelessness and increase family
expenditures for food (Mills et al. 2006). However,
there is no convincing evidence that housing assis-
tance alone improves (or undermines) children’s
educational success (Mills et al. 2006; Newman and
Harkness 2000).
One likely explanation is that the effects of hous-
ing assistance on children’s well-being depend upon
the characteristics of the neighborhood where the
housing assistance is provided. Living in public or
assisted housing in a distressed neighborhood, with
high rates of crime and violence and failing schools,
probably undermines outcomes for children (Ellen
and Turner 1997), while receiving a voucher or liv-
ing in an affordable apartment in a safe, well-served
neighborhood may enhance children’s chances for
success. Gautreaux research found striking benefits
for children whose families used vouchers to move
from central-city Chicago to suburban neighbor-
hoods. Children were substantially more likely to
complete high school, take college-track courses,
attend college, and enter the workforce than chil-
dren from similar families who moved to neighbor-
hoods within Chicago (Rosenbaum 1995).
MTO families moved to dramatically safer neigh-
borhoods than their original public housing projects,
and both mothers and girls are enjoying improved
mental and physical health as a result.28 In addition,
moving to a lower-poverty environment appears to
have reduced crime, delinquency, and risky behavior
among teenage girls, though not among boys. To
date, however, there is no evidence that MTO moves
have led to better educational outcomes, possibly
because so few children are attending significantly
better schools (Turner and Briggs 2008). These
findings suggest that it makes sense to expand the
mobility counseling and search assistance that encour-
ages voucher recipients to move to opportunity-rich
neighborhoods, but that future mobility initiatives
should focus more explicitly on helping families find,
move to, and remain in neighborhoods where the
public schools are high performing. In addition,
service providers should look for ways to help boys
adapt successfully to their new neighborhoods, help-
ing them overcome the social, emotional, and insti-
tutional barriers that stand in their way.
One little-known program explicitly targets
housing assistance to support children’s welfare. The
Family Unification Program (FUP), launched in 1992,
provides special housing vouchers (plus supportive
services) targeted to prevent children from entering
or remaining in foster care unnecessarily on account
of their families’ housing problems, and to remedy
the potential homelessness of children leaving foster
care upon reaching their 18th birthday. Under the
program, federal funds are competitively awarded to
local partnerships, consisting of PHAs that provide
the vouchers and child welfare agencies that provide
case management services. The program is small,
totaling only 39,191 vouchers nationwide. Proponents
of the program argue that the cost of foster care far
exceeds the cost of housing vouchers, and evidence
suggest that most families that received FUP assistance
were able to remain together.29 In 2008, Congress
appropriated $20 million for approximately 2,800 new
FUP vouchers.
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Housing Assistance and Vulnerable,
Multi-Problem Families
Some households that rely upon federal housing
assistance face serious personal or family challenges
that stand in the way of their long-term stability and
advancement. These include physical and mental
disabilities, chronic health problems, substance abuse,
and criminal records. In a multiyear study of five
HOPE VI projects, almost half of all the original res-
idents had one or more problems that made them
“hard to house.” Specifically, 9 percent were elderly
with no children, 30 percent were either disabled
or included grandparents with children, 12 percent
were “multi-problem” families (unemployed, no high
school diploma, drug or alcohol problem), and 5 per-
cent were large families (who needed apartments with
four or more bedrooms). These categories overlap,
so altogether, 48 percent of the original households
across the five study sites (and at least 40 percent in
each of the individual sites) fell into one or more of
these groups (Cunningham, Popkin, and Burt 2005).
The share of hard-to-house families in less distressed
public and assisted housing developments is prob-
ably lower.
Clearly, the service needs of these vulnerable
families vary dramatically. Work linkage services are
likely inappropriate for the elderly or for many dis-
abled adults who need more in the way of health
care. Younger families with children (probably the
bulk of the 12 percent multi-problem group) need
services that will help them stabilize their lives, pro-
vide a secure environment for their children, and
prepare to engage in at least some work. Trying to
push them too quickly toward self-sufficiency could
be counterproductive. In addition, these households
may have difficulty using vouchers to relocate if
their public housing projects are demolished.
For similar households that have experienced
episodes of homelessness, permanent supportive hous-
ing offers a promising solution (Bassuk et al. 2006).
An exploratory pilot project is under way in Chicago
to test the efficacy of providing intensive support
services in conjunction with vouchers for hard-to-
house families being relocated from public housing
(Popkin et al. 2008). PHAs will almost certainly need
extra resources and well-qualified partners in order
to craft and implement strategies to more effectively
serve these most vulnerable residents, which could
include expanded services delivered to residents of
existing projects, enhanced housing vouchers, and
the development of smaller supportive housing devel-
opments in conjunction with HOPE VI.
Assisted Housing and Responsible
Neighborhood Redevelopment
At its inception, public housing was intended not only
to provide decent and affordable housing for low-
income families, but also to eliminate slums and blight,
thereby helping to revitalize ailing central cities. Dur-
ing the 1960s and ’70s, public housing construction in
many cities went hand in hand with “slum clearance”
and urban renewal. Large tracts of rundown housing
(mostly in black neighborhoods) were demolished,
and displaced residents were relocated to new public
housing projects, often in distant neighborhoods.
These policies have geographically isolated poor
families—particularly poor minorities.30 Large sub-
sidized housing projects, earmarked exclusively for
occupancy by low-income families, exacerbated pre-
vailing patterns of racial segregation, redlining, and
white flight. And as years passed, poor management,
physical deterioration, and runaway crime fed a down-
ward spiral of disinvestment and distress in the sur-
rounding neighborhoods. One key lesson from this
history is that building more affordable housing—
even high-quality affordable housing—in distressed
neighborhoods does not constitute an effective
neighborhood revitalization strategy.
On the other hand, the HOPE VI experience
demonstrates that redeveloping distressed public
housing can play a critical role in restoring neighbor-
hoods, catalyzing revitalization, and strengthening
the health of cities. To date, HOPE VI projects have
significantly reduced concentrations of poverty and
crime in the surrounding neighborhoods, replaced
poorly designed and obsolete structures with high-
quality housing that harmonizes with the local archi-
tecture, and created communities that serve a mix of
income levels. In many instances, HOPE VI has been
creatively linked with other public- and private-sector
investments so redevelopment extends beyond the
immediate public housing site to upgrade streets and
sidewalks, parks, community centers, recreational
facilities, and public schools.
These investments appear to have helped catalyze
real market turnarounds in central-city neighborhoods
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that had long been given up as hopelessly distressed.
Middle- and high-income households—including
homebuyers—are moving in, market rents and sales
prices are rising, and new private-sector investment
in both homes and retail businesses is taking root.
However, the magnitude of these neighborhood
improvements varies widely across sites and, unfortu-
nately, not enough research has rigorously addressed
the issue of neighborhood impacts to pinpoint the
determinants of success. Based on research to date,
cities should choose sites for redevelopment where
the blighting effect of distressed public housing is
substantial, and where conditions seem ripe for achiev-
ing spillover benefits. And public housing redevel-
opment should be implemented in conjunction with
other city investments to capitalize on locational and
market assets and opportunities. In addition, cities
should begin experimenting with innovative strategies
for deconcentrating high-poverty projects that do
not necessarily require demolition and replacement,
possibly using a combination of income mixing and
new acquisition.
In communities where the housing market is
hot—with low vacancy rates and rapidly rising rents—
the resurgence of housing demand in a HOPE VI
neighborhood may trigger runaway gentrification.
Unless deeply subsidized housing units are replaced
(either in the redeveloped neighborhood or in
other desirable locations), rents in previously afford-
able neighborhoods climb out of reach for all but
the most affluent, voucher recipients have difficulty
using their assistance, and an opportunity to achieve
meaningful income mixing may be lost. There-
fore, the redevelopment of distressed public and
assisted housing projects can and should be more
effectively linked to a larger affordable housing
strategy that expands the availability of low-rent
options in healthy neighborhoods throughout the
city, using tools such as inclusionary zoning, LIHTCs,
HOME and local affordable housing trust fund
resources, project-based vouchers, and voucher
mobility counseling.
Housing Assistance, Smart Growth,
and Environmentally Sustainable
Development
Historically, policies focused on producing affordable
rental housing have paid little attention to environ-
mental impacts. However, the clustering of affordable
rental housing in central cities contributes to sprawl-
ing development patterns on the fringes of many
American metropolitan areas, as middle- and upper-
income households—seeking to distance themselves
from poverty and distress—move to the outer suburbs
and beyond, thus fueling new residential develop-
ment on the urban fringe. These sprawling patterns
of development yield a host of adverse environmental
consequences (Katz and Turner 2008).
Thus, efforts to redevelop distressed public hous-
ing, create viable mixed-income communities in
central-city neighborhoods, and incorporate afford-
able housing into healthy communities throughout
metropolitan regions all have the potential to con-
tribute to larger, smart growth strategies. But policies
that enable or encourage low-income families to
move to opportunity-rich neighborhoods sometimes
generate opposition from receiving neighborhoods,
because of fears that newcomers may undermine the
quality of life there. Some research has raised con-
cerns about possible negative effects of subsidized
housing—for example, where poorly managed build-
ings are located in high-value neighborhoods. How-
ever, the most careful research conducted to date
finds that smaller-scale, better designed, and better
managed subsidized housing does not lead to neigh-
borhood decline or resegregation and, indeed, can
contribute to neighborhood upgrading. In contrast,
subsidized housing clustered in lower-cost, higher-
poverty, minority neighborhoods can be detrimen-
In the neighborhoods surrounding four highly
regarded public housing redevelopment projects,
median household incomes and workforce partic-
ipation rates rose dramatically, reflecting an influx
of higher-income, working people. The market-
rate housing successfully attracted and retained
both renters and homebuyers with choices, and
increases in rents over time indicate that market
demand is robust. As a result, new, unsubsidized
investment is now under way in the surround-
ing neighborhoods. For example, once Atlanta’s
Centennial Place attracted market-rate renters,
developers began investing in loft conversions
and condominium developments nearby, bringing
significant home ownership back to the neighbor-
hood (Turbov and Piper 2005).
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tal to the receiving communities (Galster, Tatian,
and Smith 1999). Therefore, building local partner-
ships between advocates for affordable housing and
smart growth, and working together to overcome
fears and prejudices about subsidized housing, can
help expand affordable housing options and combat
sprawl.
In addition to mixed income strategies, some
affordable housing developers are explicitly focusing
on tools and incentives for incorporating principles
of energy efficiency, conservation, and environmental
sustainability into new projects. Enterprise Commu-
nity Partners has led an effort to establish criteria for
“green” affordable housing and has created a program
of grants and low-interest loans to help offset the
additional development costs associated with meeting
these criteria.31
* * * * *
Many people who are unfamiliar with federal hous-
ing programs find their complexity, high cost, and
uneven performance daunting, and they may conclude
that little can be done to address the limitations of
existing programs, improve outcomes for households
already served, or expand housing help to a larger
share of needy families. We hope this primer helps
clarify the policy landscape and highlights opportu-
nities for constructive engagement. Such engagement
can occur at many different scales: targeting sup-
plemental services and opportunities to residents of
particular subsidized projects; helping voucher re-
cipients make the best possible choices about where
to relocate; expanding the stock of affordable hous-
ing options in opportunity-rich or revitalizing neigh-
borhoods; promoting regionwide strategies for smart,
sustainable, and affordable growth; and perhaps even
reinventing the federal role in meeting the nation’s
low-income housing needs.
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Notes
1. For an excellent and more comprehensive history
of both rental and home ownership policies in
the United States, see Schwartz (2006).
2. The federal government also provides funding to
support emergency shelters, transitional housing,
and permanent supportive housing for homeless
individuals and families. These programs are
not covered here. For an excellent overview, see
National Alliance to End Homelessness (2007).
3. Initially, the federal government only provided
funding for the capital costs of public housing.
Operating subsidies were added in the 1960s
when federal legislation (the Brooke Amend-
ment) limited tenant rent payments to 25 percent
of their income (later increased to 30 percent)
and it became clear that these payments were not
sufficient to cover the costs of operating public
housing.
4. PHAs are authorized to commit up to 20 percent
of the tenant-based vouchers they administer to
projects—in effect converting them into project-
based subsidies.
5. Resources for this new Trust Fund would come
from the profits of two government-sponsored
financial intermediaries (Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac), and therefore will not be subject to annual
appropriations. It is unclear how the recent fed-
eral takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
may affect this arrangement.
6. 2005 is the last year for which comprehensive
data on housing problems and needs are reported
by HUD (see U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development 2007a). A similar report
with 2007 data is expected to be published in
2009.
7. HUD classifies a household’s income in relation
to the median income for the local housing mar-
ket area (an approach considered more equitable
than the federal poverty standard since it roughly
takes differences in costs of living into account).
According to HUD definitions, low-income is
less than 80 percent of median, very low income
is less than 50 percent of median, and extremely
low income is less than 30 percent of median.
8. Appendix table A1 shows that 16 percent of all
U.S. households fall in the extremely low income
group, very close to the 14 percent of all house-
holds that fall below the federal poverty level.
The table also shows that 29 percent are in the
very low income group (below 50 percent of
median), fairly close to the 32 percent national
share below 200 percent of the poverty level.
9. These numbers are from HUD’s authoritative
report to Congress on “Assisted Units under
Lease” (HUD 2007b).
10. This discrepancy has always plagued HUD
assessments, but it does not lead to any major dif-
ference in interpretation.
11. No national data are available on the character-
istics of households served by the LIHTC and
other shallow subsidy programs.
12. This program is discussed in more detail later in
this paper.
13. Estimates from Sard (2008).
14. The 1993 figure is from HUD (1997b). The
2007 figure is from HUD (2007b).
15. Production under most of these programs 
was terminated during the early years of the
Reagan administration. However, a very small
number of projects earmarked for the elderly
and disabled have been funded over the inter-
vening years.
16. There has been no recent comprehensive review
of where housing assistance recipients are located,
but a mid-1990s database developed by Newman
and Schnare (1997) still offers a helpful picture
of basic locational patterns for the older pro-
grams. See also HUD (1997a) and Kingsley and
Tatian (1999).
17. Some PHAs also own and operate projects
financed with state or local resources and, as dis-
cussed further below, some now compete for
and receive LIHTC allocations.
18. The HOME program also allows local jurisdic-
tions to join together to form consortia, which
may then qualify for formula funding.
19. These families and individuals include a dis-
proportionate share with multiple health and
personal problems, who were unable to relocate
with vouchers.
20. For 2008, HOPE VI was funded at $100 million,
compared with $625 million in 1999 (Sard and
Staub 2008).
21. These PHAs are Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD;
Cambridge, MA; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL;
Delaware (state); District of Columbia; Greene,
OH (metropolitan area); High Point, NC; Keene,
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NH; King County, WA; Lawrence-Douglas
County, KS; Lincoln, NE; Louisville, KY (metro-
politan area); Massachusetts (state); Minneapolis,
MN; New Haven, CT; Oakland, CA; Philadel-
phia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; Portage, OH; Portland,
OR; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; San
Jose, CA; San Mateo County, CA; Santa Clara
County, CA; Seattle, WA; Tulare County, CA;
and Vancouver, WA.
22. Elderly and disabled residents are not subject to
these changes.
23. The Department of Labor maintains a current
list of minimum wage laws in each state at http://
www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm.
24. The first such ordinance was passed in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, in the mid-1970s.
Today, around 5 percent of the U.S. population
lives in communities that require affordable
housing to be built in any new development.
Over 100 of these localities are in California,
with most of the others clustered around Boston
and Washington, D.C.
25. The FY 2004 budget for the ROSS program
provided $16 million for services for families,
$11.4 million for services for the elderly and
persons with disabilities, $13.2 million for services
to promote home ownership, and $16 million
for FSS coordinators to serve public housing
residents.
26. Solomon (2005), 47. Also see http://www.hud.
gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/ross/about.cfm.
27. For a more complete explanation of the
Gautreaux and MTO experiments and discus-
sion of their differing results, see Turner and
Briggs (2008).
28. Mother’s mental health is a critical determinant
of healthy development for young children
(Hayes et al. 2001; Martins and Gaffan 2000;
Olfson et al. 2003). Thus, it is possible that
improvements in mental health among mothers
and adolescent girls will translate into significantly
improved child well-being over the long term.
29. See Child Welfare League of America, “Family
Unification Program FAQ,” http://www.cwla.
org/PROGRAMS/HOUSING/FUPfaq.htm
(accessed August 2008).
30. This isolation was intensified by federal poli-
cies that targeted scarce public housing resources
to the neediest households on the waiting list,
significantly reducing the number of moderate-
income working families living in public housing.
31. See http://www.greencommunitiesonline.org.
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T A B L E  A 1
Income Categories from 2005 American Housing Survey
Households (millions) Percent
Total Renter Owner Total Renter Owner
Total 108.9 34.0 75.0 100 100 100
In relation to local area median
0–30% of median 17.2 9.7 7.5 16 29 10
30–50% of median 14.0 6.3 7.6 13 19 10
Very low income 31.2 16.1 15.1 29 47 20
50–80% of median 19.3 7.5 11.8 18 22 16
Low income 50.5 23.6 26.9 46 69 36
80–120% of median 20.7 5.4 15.2 19 16 20
Above 120% of median 37.8 4.9 32.8 35 15 44
In relation to federal poverty level
0–50% of poverty level 7.0 4.0 3.0 6 12 4
50–100% of poverty level 8.1 4.7 3.4 7 14 5
Below poverty level 15.1 8.7 6.5 14 26 9
100–200% of poverty level 19.4 8.6 10.8 18 25 14
Below 200% of poverty level 34.5 17.2 17.3 32 51 23
Above 200% of poverty level 74.4 16.7 57.7 68 49 77
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